India's Military Modernisation: The Cohesion Problem
India spends huge sums on defence. But the equipment often does not work together. A simple guide to cohesion, jointness, and why purchases take so long.
India buys many weapons. But is the force getting stronger?
Think of a football team. You can buy eleven excellent players. Each one is expensive and talented. But if they do not pass to each other, you will still lose the match.
India's military has a similar problem.
India gives more money to defence than to any other ministry. It buys fighter jets, warships, rifles and drones. The amounts are very large.
But the equipment often does not work together. And the three services, the Army, the Navy and the Air Force, often plan separately.
There is a name for this problem. It is called strategic cohesion. It means three things should match:
- what the country buys
- how it organises its forces
- what it plans to do in a war
Remember this one line. A force is modern when all its parts work together as one system. Not when each part is simply new.
First, a real example
On 27 February 2019, one day after the Balakot air strike, Indian and Pakistani aircraft were fighting near the Line of Control. It was a confused and fast-moving morning.
An Indian Mi-17 helicopter was flying near Budgam in Kashmir. An Indian air defence unit on the ground saw it on radar. The system that marks an aircraft as friendly was not active at that moment.
The ground unit treated the helicopter as an enemy aircraft and fired. The helicopter was destroyed. Six air force personnel and one civilian on the ground died.
Now notice something important. The missile worked. The helicopter worked. Both were modern equipment. The crew and the missile unit were both trained.
They simply could not recognise each other.
This is what weak cohesion means in real life. Good equipment, used by trained people, that still cannot work together.
Two terms you must know
Almost every argument on this topic uses these two ideas. Learn them once.
| Buying platforms | Building capability |
|---|
| Buying one jet, tank or ship | Building a system where the parts work together |
| Success means the contract is signed | Success means the force performs well in a real operation |
| Each service decides on its own | All three services first agree on what is needed |
| You get new equipment | You get real fighting strength |
A country can buy weapons every year and still not get stronger. This happens when each purchase is decided separately.
What cohesion means in simple words
Three things:
- Jointness — the Army, Navy and Air Force plan, train and fight as one team. If all three buy drones separately, India ends up with three different systems that cannot share information with each other.
- Integration — radars, weapons and computers can talk to each other. If a Navy ship spots a target, an Air Force jet should be able to strike it.
- Direction — the country states clearly what the military is being built for.
If the third one is missing, the first two have nothing to follow.
Why does this happen?
Reason one. Each service prepares for its own war.
The Army looks at the land border. The Navy looks at the sea. The Air Force looks at air power. Each view is sensible on its own. But when each service writes its own shopping list, the three lists do not fit together.
Reason two. Urgent shortages push out long-term projects.
Suppose soldiers need rifles and ammunition today. Money is moved from a long-term project to buy them. The urgent problem gets solved. The long-term capability is delayed once again. This happens repeatedly, and the delayed project is usually the one that would have built future strength.
Reason three. India has no written national security strategy.
Most large countries publish a document that says what they are protecting, who the threat is, and what comes first. India does plan, but it publishes no such document. Without it, each service decides its own priorities.
Old problems that keep returning
The engine problem is sixty years old.
In the 1960s India built its own fighter jet, the HF-24 Marut. It first flew in 1961. But India never obtained a powerful enough engine for it. The aircraft could never reach the performance it was designed for.
Today the Tejas Mk1A is an Indian fighter jet and a real achievement. Its deliveries are late, mainly because the engines come from abroad.
Same country. Same problem. Sixty years apart.
This is what happens when each project is treated as a separate purchase, instead of one step in a long plan. The lesson from the first aircraft was not carried forward into the next one.
Decisions take longer than the need lasts.
India wanted 126 foreign fighter jets. The tender came out in 2007. It was cancelled in 2015. India then bought 36 Rafale jets directly. A new plan for about 114 jets is still not complete.
Nearly twenty years have passed. The aircraft available in the market have changed. The threat has changed. The requirement is still not settled.
Requirements ignore real conditions.
The Arjun tank is powerful and well protected. But it weighs about 68 tonnes. Many bridges near the likely battle areas, and many railway wagons, cannot carry that weight easily.
The tank was designed for maximum protection. Whether it could actually reach the place it is needed was not fully checked. A good tank is of little use if it cannot get there.
Sometimes the argument is about status, not need.
Aircraft carriers are the clearest example. This is a real debate, and both sides have a fair point.
One side says carriers are necessary. India has a long coastline and island territories. Chinese warships now enter the Indian Ocean regularly. A carrier lets India use air power far away from its own airfields.
The other side says carriers are very costly and are large targets for modern missiles. The same money could buy many submarines, which are much harder to find.
In a GD, explaining both sides here will score better than shouting for one side.
India has already fixed many things
Do not only criticise in a GD. That sounds weak and unprepared. India has made real changes:
- The Kargil Review Committee (1999) studied what went wrong in the Kargil war. It found poor coordination between the services.
- A group of ministers in 2001 said India needs one senior officer to give single-point military advice.
- This happened in December 2019. India created the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS). It also created a Department of Military Affairs inside the Defence Ministry, headed by a military officer instead of a civilian official.
- The Inter-Services Organisations Act, 2023 fixed a legal gap. Earlier a commander from one service had no authority to discipline soldiers of another service. Joint commands could exist on paper but not work in practice. Now that authority exists.
- Andaman and Nicobar Command, started in 2001, is India's only command where all three services work under one commander.
So India knows the problem and is acting on it. The debate is about speed, not about whether anyone has noticed.
Should India match China, or do something different?
China has more ships, more aircraft and a larger defence budget. The easy answer is to match it item by item. But that is a race India would have to keep funding forever, against a richer country.
The other way is called asymmetry. It means building things that make the enemy's strength difficult to use.
A simple example. A very expensive warship can be threatened by a missile or a drone costing a tiny fraction of its price. The cheaper side does not need to match the ship. It only needs to make sailing there dangerous.
Submarines, long-range missiles, drones, electronic warfare, cyber and space all work this way.
Deciding where not to compete is also a strategy.
In a GD on "Is India's defence modernisation on track?", most people say the same two things. One group says budgets are at a record high and India now builds its own jets. The other group says there are delays and shortages.
You can stand out with one simple shift. Say the real question is not how much India buys, but whether the purchases work together.
Then give one concrete example. Budgam in 2019 is the strongest, because nothing was wrong with the equipment itself.
Then give both sides.
Good points: the CDS post and the Department of Military Affairs created in 2019. The Inter-Services Organisations Act of 2023. Three-fourths of the buying budget reserved for Indian companies.
Problems: the fighter jet requirement from 2007 is still not settled. Indian jets still wait for foreign engines, which was also the problem with the Marut in the 1960s. There is no published national security strategy.
End with something useful, not only complaint. For example, say that jointness is first a legal and organisational change, and only after that an equipment problem.
Speak in short clear sentences. Give facts. Accept a good point made by someone else. That is what the assessors are looking for.
Three simple parts for a three-minute talk.
Part one, the good news. India spends record amounts on defence. It builds its own jets, ships and missiles. Say this first so your talk sounds balanced.
Part two, the problem. Explain cohesion with the football team example in one line. Then give the Budgam accident of 2019 as proof, and the fighter jet search running since 2007 as the second example.
Part three, your opinion. Reforms have started with the CDS, the Department of Military Affairs and the ISO Act. What is missing is a written national strategy.
Finish with a clear stand. A clear opinion is always better than a long list of problems.
Key terms
- Strategic cohesion
- What a country buys, how it organises, and what it plans should all match
- Jointness
- The three services planning, training and fighting as one team
- Theatre command
- One commander controlling land, air and naval forces in one area
- CDS
- Chief of Defence Staff, created in December 2019 to give single-point military advice
- Department of Military Affairs
- Defence Ministry department created in 2019 and headed by the CDS
- ISO Act 2023
- Law that lets a commander discipline soldiers of another service in a joint unit
- Andaman and Nicobar Command
- India's only command where all three services work under one commander
- Kargil Review Committee
- 1999 committee whose findings led to the demand for a CDS
- HF-24 Marut
- India's first home-built fighter jet, flown in 1961, which never got a strong enough engine
- MRFA
- Multi-Role Fighter Aircraft, the long pending plan to buy about 114 jets
- Interoperability
- The ability of different services' equipment to work together
- IFF
- Identification Friend or Foe, the system that tells own aircraft from enemy aircraft
- Asymmetric capability
- Building strength that makes the enemy's advantage hard to use
- Atmanirbhar Bharat
- India's self-reliance mission, here meaning defence equipment made in India
Five points to remember
- The problem is cohesion, not money. Eleven good players still lose if they do not pass.
- Budgam, February 2019, is the clearest proof. Good equipment that could not recognise each other.
- The engine problem runs from the Marut in 1961 to the Tejas today.
- The foreign fighter jet plan has been pending since 2007.
- India has no published national security strategy.
Where to read more
Read the original documents, not only news summaries:
- The Ministry of Defence Annual Report, which lists each year's priorities.
- The Defence Acquisition Procedure 2020, the actual rulebook for buying equipment.
- The Standing Committee on Defence reports in Parliament. These are surprisingly honest about delays and shortages.
If you read even one Standing Committee report, you will speak on this topic far better than someone who has only read headlines.
Read the MoD Annual Report
Now practise it. Open a GD room on this topic and defend your view out loud, against people who will disagree.
Discuss this in a GD room
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